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This article addresses a general problem in media sociology - how to understand the 
media both as an internal production process and as a general frame for categorising the 
social world – with specific reference to a version of this problem in recent work on 
media within Bourdieu’s field-based tradition of research (work previously reviewed by 
Rodney Benson in Theory and Society 48). It argues that certain problems arise in 
reconciling this work’s detailed explanations of the media field’s internal workings (and 
the interrelations of that field’s workings to the workings of other fields) and general 
claims made about the ‘symbolic power’ of media in a broader sense. These problems 
can be solved, the author argues, by adopting the concept of metacapital developed by 
Bourdieu himself in his late work on the state, and returning to the wider framework of 
symbolic system and symbolic power that was important in Bourdieu’s social theory 
before it became dominated by field-theory. Media, it is proposed, have meta-capital over 
the rules of play, and the definition of capital (especially symbolic capital), that operate 
within a wide range of contemporary fields of production, and this level of explanation 
needs to be added to specific accounts of the detailed workings of the media field. The 
conclusion points to questions for further work, including on the relative strength of the 
state’s and the media’s metacapital which must be carried out through detailed empirical 
work on a global comparative basis.
 3
MEDIA META-CAPITAL: EXTENDING THE RANGE OF BOURDIEU’S FIELD 
THEORY 
     
 
The question of media power in a broad sense – how are we to theorise the long-term 
impacts of the existence and actions of media institutions on social space?1 – remains one 
of great difficulty. The media are both a production process with specific internal 
characteristics (possibly a field of such processes) and a source of taken-for-granted 
frameworks for understanding the reality they represent (an influence, potentially, on 
action in all fields). Accounts of media and media power which concentrate exclusively 
on either questions of ‘production’ or on questions of ideological ‘effects’ are likely, 
therefore, to be unsatisfactory. A version of the former problem faces recent work on 
media within Pierre Bourdieu’s tradition of field-based research, in spite of that work’s 
other virtues. The solution lies in drawing more extensively than such research has done 
to date on Bourdieu’s own theory of the state, particularly the concept of the state’s 
‘metacapital’ over all fields, which offers, as we shall see, a useful analogy to, although 
not a direct explanation for, the way media institutions impact on an increasingly large 
range of other fields. This, however, represents a significant extension of the parameters 
of field-theory, as usually understood. 
 
This argument  requires some historical context. Media are one area where the dialogue 
between Anglo-American sociology and what can justifiably be called Bourdieu’s 
‘school of sociology’2 has been limited, although, as Rodney Benson3 showed recently in 
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this journal, media attracted considerable attention in the 1990s not so much from 
Bourdieu himself as from his research associates, particularly Patrick Champagne.4 One 
reason, perhaps, for this limited dialogue is an underlying historical and theoretical 
tension between Marxist-influenced Anglo-American accounts of media power directed 
at the media’s ideological impacts on the whole of society and Bourdieu’s tradition of 
field-based research that is hostile precisely to general theorising about social space.5 For 
that reason, there is no simple basis of exchange  between recent Bourdieu-inspired work 
on media and other better-known theorisations of media and media power.  
 
This is worth explaining in a little more detail, in order to contextualise the extended 
version of Bourdieu’s field theory proposed in this article. If the influential 1970s and 
1980s British and American tradition of critical media sociology approached the media’s 
contribution to social reality through ideology6, arguing that the media reproduce and 
disseminate ideological contents originally generated elsewhere (above all, the state), the 
causal relationship between media-channeled ideology and people’s beliefs proved 
elusive;7 in any case, this work told us little about the status of media institutions 
themselves in society generally or in specific sectors of social life.8 By contrast, 
postmodern social theory9 did address the impacts of media institutions on social 
structure, but only through suggestive pronouncements, rather than empirically grounded 
detail, so there is no basis of reconnection with Bourdieu’s work here. Within a third 
perspective, Luhmann’s systems model of ‘the reality of the mass media’10 offers (in its 
own terms at least) a rigorous account of how media work within social reality, but one 
which excludes ideological effects. The truth or falsity of specific media representations 
 5
is irrelevant according to Luhmann,11 who concentrates on the broad functional 
interrelations between media ‘system’ and social ‘system’, thereby obscuring precisely 
the contingencies underlying the media process that are most ideological: the tendency 
for this person or thing, rather than that, to be heard or seen. So while in its respect for the 
internal workings of media as a productive system Luhmann’s work has something in 
common with Bourdieu, the former’s neglect of issues of conflict and power moves as far 
as possible from the political commitment of the latter, who in this respect is much closer 
to Anglo-US ideology critiques. 
 
Bourdieu’s own work on media and that of researchers close to him could not insist more 
strongly on the wider social and political consequences of the media process. The result 
has been some of the boldest criticisms of ‘media culture’ in any tradition, a further 
reason for the recent unpopularity of such of its work (mainly Bourdieu’s On Television 
and Journalism) as has reached audiences in Britain and the US, where sweeping 
criticisms of contemporary media have in some quarters become unfashionable. Take this 
remark from that book: ‘one thing leads to another, and, ultimately television, which 
claims to record reality, creates it instead. We are getting closer and closer to the point 
where the social world is primarily described – and in a sense prescribed – by 
television’.12 The French version is more vivid: ‘on va de plus en plus vers des univers ou 
le monde social est décrit-prescrit par la télévision. La télévision devient l’arbitre de 
l’accès à l’existence sociale et politique’ .13 The hybrid word ‘décrit-prescrit’ captures, if 
polemically, the naturalising effect of an institutional sector which generates the very 
categories through which the social world14 is perceived: a classic Durkheimian point. 
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Similarly bold comments on the ‘symbolic power’ of the media, particularly television, 
are found in the work of Champagne, as we shall see (section 1b below). The question, 
however, on which this article focuses is whether these bold statements are theoretically 
compatible with the field-theory of media, the latter being the only developed theory of 
media that Bourdieu and linked researchers have offered. As that theory stands, they are 
not.  
 
While we come later to the virtues of field-based media research (section 1(a)), there is 
also something paradoxical about it, at least viewed from other media research traditions, 
in that it avoids both a general account of the impacts of media representations on social 
space and a detailed account of media audiences. Its explanatory dynamics are located 
entirely in the internal workings of the journalistic field or in the specific connections 
between those internal workings and the operations of other fields which come into 
contact with it. The result is often to extend in interesting ways Anglo-US work on the 
sociology of media production.15 The cost, however, is a tension (section 1(b) below) 
between the avoidance of theoretical issues that arise outside the field model and the 
bolder judgements about media that its proponents, probably justifiably, want to make.   
 
This tension is linked to a wider division in Bourdieu’s work between his early, less field-
focussed, work on symbolic systems and symbolic power (see section 1(c)) and his later 
work on fields. This is not so much a problem, as a genuine theoretical crux, since we are 
back here to the original difficulty for all theorisations of media with which this article 
began. Hence resolving the tensions of field-based accounts of media, as this article tries 
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to do, by drawing on Bourdieu’s theorisation elsewhere of the state’s social power (see 
section 2), has dividends, not only for our appreciation of the continuity of Bourdieu’s 
work, but also for rethinking some of the aporias of 1970s and 1980s Marxist work on 
media ideology. It is ironic, no doubt, to be arguing - a quarter of a century since the 
heyday of Althusserian theories of the media’s role among the ‘ideological state 
apparatuses’ - that the way forward for contemporary media analyses is via a linkage 
between Bourdieu’s divergent theories of the media field and the state (Bourdieu himself 
having clearly turned his back on Althusserian models).16 The difference, however, 
between the argument developed here and earlier Anglo-US approaches to media/ state is 
that, first, we will build on the achievements of Bourdieu’s own sociology with its 
rejection of crude totalising accounts of power from ‘the centre’ and, second, we will 
seek in doing so to draw on the Durkheim-inspired insights into symbolic power 
elsewhere in Bourdieu’s work. As to the latter Durkheimian tradition, including 
Bourdieu’s own attempt to fuse Marx and Durkheim, it has been ignored in Anglo-US 
media sociology, with only a few exceptions.17   
 
It is necessary to clarify, first, how the term ‘media’ will be used. By ‘media’ here is 
meant the media which, until recently, have been assumed to be society’s ‘central’ media 
- television, radio and the general press. True, this cuts across a valid distinction between 
‘central’ media and media more specialised in their audience, but this is necessary if we 
are to begin to address the dimension of media most challenging for field theory: 
precisely the broader social impact of ‘les médias de grande diffusion’18, both within and 
beyond specific fields.19 True, this leaves to one side arguments about whether new 
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media (particularly the Internet and media digitalization) will undermine or simply 
refashion the social centrality currently attributed to television, radio and the press.20 But 
this simplification is justified tactically for two reasons. First, it reflects the focus of 
media research in the Bourdieu tradition which has not to date analysed new media. 
Second, there are good reasons to be sceptical about how fundamentally new media, 
especially the Internet, are changing patterns of media consumption, let alone people’s 
orientation to media as sources of social legitimacy.21 The conclusion, however, returns 
to this and other broader issues raised by the analysis.   
 
1. The Incompleteness of the Media Field 
 
There is little doubt that, as a sphere of cultural production, the media can prima facie be 
analysed as a single field, or a collection of fields, (each) with a distinctive pattern of 
prestige and status, its own values.  Indeed, according to Bourdieu, the media’s 
intermediate position between the cultural and economic poles of the wider cultural field 
gives it a particular interest as a field. This section notes the positive contribution of field 
theory to media analysis, before identifying a key tension in its treatment of media power.  
 
(a) The Media as Field(s)? 
 
In the course of the 1990s, Bourdieu’s research associates produced a number of 
illuminating studies of the workings of the ‘journalistic field’ (champ journalistique) or 
‘media field’ (champ médiatique), both terms being used, although the former is more 
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common. The main argument running through this research was summarised by Bourdieu 
himself in his contrvoversial lectures published in English under the title On Television 
and Journalism. The argument which is framed in relation to French media culture is 
essentially as follows:  
 
1. the journalistic field has always occupied a pivotal role in the field of cultural 
production, because of its specific role in circulating to a wider audience the 
knowledges of other, more specialised fields. As such, the journalistic field faces 
contradictory pressures from economic (heteronomous) and cultural (autonomous) 
forces.  
2. In the 1980s and 1990s a combination of factors (including challenges to Le Monde’s 
legitimacy as the main representative of ‘serious’ journalism and the increasing 
legitimacy of television, as a mode of popular journalism) led to an increasing 
influence of television over press journalism and the increasing predominance of 
economic influences in the media field as a whole. 
3. The increasing heteronomy of the media field has had profound effects on other fields 
of cultural production through the specific form which their relations to the media 
field have come to take: an increased influence of television news criteria within 
journalism has increased the susceptibility of those other fields to external (economic) 
pressures, reducing their autonomy as fields and increasing their reliance, 
specifically, on the media field. 
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No doubt we have learnt much from field-based treatments of the media. First, there have 
been detailed accounts of the changing workings of the journalistic field (2. above) 
showing specific ways in which journalistic autonomy, not just in France but also in the 
US, has been reduced.22. There remain, of course, numerous issues of detail, such as 
whether there is one such field or many, and, if many, how are they interrelated,23 but 
they are of secondary importance, since for Bourdieu the exact boundaries of fields and 
sub-fields always remains a contingent question for detailed empirical enquiry, rather 
than a theoretical issue.  Much more important are the advances that field research has 
brought to our understanding of journalistic sources and story-telling practices, 
augmenting previous Anglo-US work on the sociology of journalism carried out under 
very different economic and cultural conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s (see above). 
 
The other way in which field research has contributed to our understanding of media is 
accounts of the changing interrelations between the media field and other fields of 
cultural production (3. above). These have been discussed in detail by Rodney Benson,24, 
so will not be repeated here; they include studies of media’s influences on the intellectual 
field, the judiciary and the medical field. Together they build a rich, historically nuanced, 
picture of the increasing influence in many fields of a generalist, economically driven 
journalism. These accounts rely not on any general notion of ideology, but on specific 
analyses of how the changing internal dynamics of the journalistic field (for example, 
struggles for dominance between specialist medical press and general news journalists) 
mesh with the dynamics of those other fields (for example, the emergence of new 
spokespersons and interest groups in and around the medical field): see for the medical 
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case Champagne and Marchetti’s work discussed further below. It is clear that much is 
gained by breaking down otherwise highly general claims about ‘media power’ into 
specific, historically researchable questions about how external factors (the increasing 
economic pressures on media production) ‘are “translated” by the internal logic of the 
news media field (and then, how this translated logic is translated into other related 
fields)’.25  
 
There are, however, limitations to the field theory model developed in this work. As 
Benson argues, there is an ambiguity about what exactly is the source of the ‘external 
factors’ influencing the media field and the balance within those external factors of 
economic (market) and political (state) forces; this ambiguity relates to an ambivalence 
about how to analyse the state itself.26 This affects how one can read the direction of 
influence between the media field and other fields (such as the medical field), given that 
economic and political forces affect each in quite specific ways.  
 
This article, however, will be concerned with a different issue, namely the implications of 
the type of influence which field research posits from the media field to other fields. How 
fields interrelate has always been a difficult question for a research programme whose 
first concern is always with the internal workings of particular fields.27 To understand 
field interrelations field theory has relied on the notion that sets of fields change in 
tandem through ‘homologies’ between their internal operations, but as Swartz points out 
‘homology’ just defers explanation to the question of what forces drive the actors in those 
fields. In Bourdieu’s earlier work, this was above all ‘habitus’,28 but, given the bias of 
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habitus towards influences from long-standing dispositions, it is much less clear what 
underlying mechanism field theory has at its disposal to explain the convergences of sets 
of fields in a fast-changing economic and cultural environment. 29  
 
So far this problem is a general one. The two next sections specify more clearly what is at 
stake here, linking to broader questions of symbolic power which cannot be contained 
within the framework of field theory.  
 
(b) Specific Problem Cases for a Field Theory of Media  
 
I want first to show, more directly, that using field theory as an exclusive framework of 
explanation creates difficulties, or gaps, in Bourdieu’s and his research associates’ 
account of the media.  
 
Let’s turn to Bourdieu’s main explicit treatment of the media, the two television talks 
collected under the title On Television and Journalism.30 This book has been criticised for 
some of its more sweeping generalisations about the way media represent the social 
world (their ‘trivialisation’ of it). I am not convinced by these criticisms, particularly 
given the background of empirical work on media fields on which Bourdieu implicitly 
relied. My interest instead is with the gap between Bourdieu’s detailed discussion of how 
the media field(s) operate as fields of production and his reference to the overwhelming 
‘symbolic power’ of television. Implicitly the gap is filled by the convergences assumed 
between changes within the journalistic field (television’s increasing dominance, with its 
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greater susceptibility to economic influences translated through appeals to audience 
ratings) and changes in other fields (their increased openness to relations within the 
journalistic field). But how exactly does this convergence work?   
 
There must be some causal mechanism that explains how what actors in particular non-
media fields do is changing. There is more than one type of explanation that could fill 
this gap in relation to any one non-media field: (1) specific factors (for example, an 
increasing dependence on markets or audiences reachable only through media) that make 
media coverage of increased importance to actors in that particular non-media field; (2) 
specific factors making media coverage more important to actors in a range of related 
non-media fields (for example, the pressures from the state to make various types of 
service politically ‘accountable’, as currently in the educational or health fields); or (3) 
general factors that have increased the perceived importance of media coverage across all 
fields. Only the first type of explanation remains within the framework of field theory. 
The second involves acknowledging changing pressures from other sources on a range of 
fields, so moving beyond what the intensified economic forces which Bourdieu sees as 
operating through the proxy of the media field.  The third type of explanation raises 
questions about the simultaneous influences of media on all fields and possibly on the 
whole of social space, exactly the type of explanation that field research would normally 
rule out on principle. Yet Bourdieu’s account of television does not satisfactorily resolve 
the choice between these alternative explanatory paths.  
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A similar problem emerges in Patrick Champagne’s work on media. Champagne31 in 
Faire L’Opinion analyses the media’s impacts on contemporary politics through an 
account of the complex interrelations of the journalistic and the political field. The 
journalistic field has a relationship with the political field so close that Champagne is 
tempted to refer to it as ‘a journalistic-political field’ or ‘space’.32. That relationship, 
argues Champagne, has transformed the definition of politics,33 but not for the good. The 
political field has become increasingly insulated from external influences and conflicts 
(i.e. from those that politicians are meant to represent). By a ‘circular logic’,34 both 
journalists and politicians ‘react’ to a version of public opinion which they have largely 
constructed, through the framing of questions for opinion polls, the reported reactions to 
those polls’ results, and through the influence of journalists’ accounts of politics. The 
same circular logic constrains those outside the political hierarchy who might otherwise 
break through it; two decades after Baudrillard,35 but with much greater sociological 
authority, Champagne36 argues that demonstrations are often created for the media, as a 
means of communicating through, and therefore on the terms of, the media.37  
 
There is much that is interesting here, but the question again is its theoretical 
completeness. First, there is something like a sleight of hand in the idea that the 
previously separate journalistic and political fields have merged. This enables 
Champagne to talk of the influence of journalists’ definitions of ‘events’ on politicians’ 
definitions of events, without addressing the crucial difficulty: how exactly have 
representations made by actors in one field come to have such influence on the actions 
and thoughts of across in another field? Elsewhere, Champagne attempts to harness the 
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question of media influence on non-media actors back into field theory by claiming that 
people’s differential ability to work well with the media somehow reflects, by a 
homology, the structures of capital in the fields to which those actors primarily belong:  
 
Everything happens as if the journalistic event was a transposed form, in the relatively 
autonomous logic of the journalistic field, of the economic, institutional, cultural or 
symbolic capital which social groups [wanting to be represented in the media] have at 
their disposal [i.e. for application in their own fields].38  
 
It is unclear however how this homology works. Interestingly, Champagne introduces the 
notion of a new specific type of capital - ‘media capital’ (capital médiatique)39 to capture 
people’s relative ability to influence journalistic events.40 But there is only the briefest 
explanation of this new term,41 even though it implies an effect that field theory cannot 
easily encompass. Where, we might ask, is media capital acquired and exercised? In the 
media field or in the (political, medical, academic, etc) field where the agent in question 
primarily acts? Perhaps the point of the term ‘journalistic-political field’ is that such 
questions don’t matter when analysing the media’s interactions with politics. But suppose 
we repeated this move in explaining all non-media fields and their relation to media. The 
result would be either to fuse all fields influenced by media into a single ‘journalistic-
cultural field’ or to generate a whole parallel set of hybrid ‘journalistic-specialist’ fields 
(medical, political, and so on) each with its own version of ‘media capital’. Either way, 
the strength of the field model – its differentiation of the specific dynamics of particular 
fields - would have been blunted.  
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The difficulty can be illustrated further by returning to Champagne and Marchetti’s 
analysis of the changing interrelations of media and medical fields around the AIDS 
crisis in late 1980s France.42 Our concern here is solely with the way the causal 
interrelation of these two fields is theorised.43 What is striking in Champagne and 
Marchetti’s discussion is a dissonance between their detailed explication of the changing 
dynamics of, respectively, the subfield of medicine-focussed journalists and the medical 
field, and their very bold statements about ‘the growing omnipresence and power accrued 
to the media and particularly television’.44 Their analysis of the latter is concerned 
particularly with the ability of television to define and then generally impose a particular 
definition of the medical ‘scandal’ which cut across older, more nuanced and 
scientifically accountable definitions of medical news: 
 
[1] So the power of the press in the constitution of ‘scandals’ is fundamental, not the 
power of the “press of scandals” [yellow press]  . . . but that of the main press [la 
grande presse] and especially the Parisian press. It is without doubt hardly an 
exaggeration to say that what is ‘scandalous’ is what the journalistic field, acting 
together, considers as such and goes on to impose on everyone [parvient surtout à 
imposer à tous] . . . [2] What is astonishing in the affair of the contaminated blood is 
that the qualification of facts as scandalous, far from being evident and immediate, has 
been the result of a singular battle which notably opposed, over many months, certain 
victims of the blood contamination against the State, the judiciary and journalists, then 
 17 
opposed journalists to the medical and political sectors, and finally opposed journalists 
against each other.45   
 
Again note the disjuncture between the second process described (the various inter-field 
factors which contributed to the definition of this particular case of contaminated blood 
as a scandal) and the first process (the general power of journalists acting together (dans 
son ensemble) to define whatever is ‘scandalous’ and impose that definition across the 
board). The first process cannot be reduced to the second, since the latter is general and 
the former is specific; why not argue, for instance, that the contaminated blood scandal 
was a wholly exceptional instance, resting on a very specific historical coincidence of 
battles in the journalistic and medical fields? If so, the first process needs its own 
explanation: how exactly is it that the main press can ‘impose’ their definitions ‘on all’ 
and who do we mean by ‘all’? Just some (but an ever increasing number of) specialist 
cultural fields? Or all fields? Or the whole of social space, including newspaper readers, 
some of whom may not belong to any field and certainly not the journalistic or medical 
fields? 
 
It is striking that readers of these press debates are largely absent from Champagne and 
Marchetti’s account, apart from a passing reference: 
 
So a vision of things is collectively constructed which owes all its force to the fact that 
it is close to what preexists in the popular consciousness, journalists never having 
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more force on these occasions than when they speak to ‘[public] opinion’ what it 
wants to hear.46 
 
Benson plausibly reads this as a hegemony-style argument,47 but if so, like any hegemony 
style argument, it must say something about the impacts of hegemonic representations on 
those who are assumed to believe them. This is precisely what cannot be done 
satisfactorily within the confines of a field-based account, because many or most of those 
over whom hegemony is assumed to be exercised are not members of the fields in 
question; they may be professionals who belong to other fields or people who belong no 
field at all. 
 
The point here is that field-based accounts of media are irrevocably pushed towards a 
type of explanation which spills out beyond the field model – if that is they are to sustain 
the bold claims about the media’s broader ‘symbolic power’ which gives this analysis 
much of its critical edge.  
 
At this point we need to be clear about what exactly we mean by ‘symbolic power’. 
There is a weak and a strong definition of symbolic power between which we must 
choose. John Thompson’s work48 valuably insists on the symbolic as an important 
dimension of power alongside the political and the economic. Thompson defines 
‘symbolic power’ as the ‘capacity to intervene in the course of events, to influence the 
actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and 
transmission of symbolic forms’.49 This definition helpfully captures in general terms the 
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power of a number of social institutions over symbolic production: the media, the church, 
educational institutions. But it is a weak concept of symbolic power, because it does not 
allow for the possibility that certain types of concentration of symbolic power (for 
example in media institutions) require a special analysis.  In particular, Thompson50rules 
out a possibility, suggested by Bourdieu’s work, that certain forms of symbolic power are 
necessarily misrecognised. A strong concept of symbolic power, by contrast, suggests 
that some concentrations of symbolic power are so great that they dominate the whole 
social landscape; as a result, they seem so natural that they are misrecognised, and their 
underlying arbitrariness becomes difficult to see. In this way, symbolic power moves 
from being a merely local power (the power to construct this statement, or make this 
work of art) to being a general power, what Bourdieu once called a ‘power of 
constructing [social] reality’.51 It is the second, strong definition of symbolic power that 
Bourdieu presumably has in mind when he talks of the symbolic power of television. 
Such symbolic power legitimates key categories with both cognitive and social force52 
and is defined ‘in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and 
reproduced’.53 This power, although it is relevant to the way certain types of capital are 
constituted as symbolic capital in the context of particular fields, is relevant also to the 
wider field of power, and indeed social space as a whole. How exactly the media’s 
symbolic power in this broad sense should be theorised consistently with field theory is, 
as we shall see, illuminated by Bourdieu’s late writings on the state. 
 
(c) The Media as Symbolic System 
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This problem can be reformulated as a question about the treatment of symbolic power in 
Bourdieu’s work more generally. 
 
The analysis by Champagne and Marchetti of the media’s growing influence over the 
medical field turns, as we have seen, on the pervasive influence of specific definitions of 
the ‘scandalous’ produced in a medical context. But this notion of ‘scandal’, whatever the 
origins of its formulation in particular cases, has much wider usage; it is arguably central 
to our understanding of the media’s impacts on social space.54 This opens a connection 
with a rather different type of argument (unconnected with field theory) found in 
Bourdieu’s writings: the construction of the socially resonant systems of categories that 
Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic systems’. In an early lecture on ‘symbolic power’55 Bourdieu 
used the term ‘symbolic system’ to describe both the university system and much earlier 
religious systems which each had authority to classify social space as a whole. Behind 
this lies Bourdieu’s original Durkheimian notion that religious institutions exercise a 
‘monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the power to modify . . . the practice and world-
view of lay people’.56 A version of this idea pervades Bourdieu’s whole sociology of 
education; it is present also in his interesting essays on ‘rites of institution’ and ‘symbolic 
power’,57 which were developed in part with reference to societies without highly 
complex differentiations of labour.58 Crucially the concept of symbolic systems (having 
been developed before fields came to dominate Bourdieu’s research agenda) implies an 
explanatory framework which cuts across field theory. For a ‘symbolic system’ is a 
structure of misrecognition that works precisely because of its pervasiveness across social 
space, because of its totalising force.   
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Is it possible that the gaps we found in field theory-based accounts of the media can be 
addressed by using concepts (such as symbolic system), which are not tied to the 
explanatory framework of the field?  This would, first, have the merit of linking recent 
work on media within the Bourdieu tradition more closely to other areas of Bourdieu’s 
work. Specifically, it would clarify the persistence in, for example, Champagne’s work of 
terms more natural in that earlier context, such as ‘consecration’,59 that is the media’s 
ability to sanctify certain things as having primary importance.60 Second, and more 
important, a connection to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic systems allows into view the 
impacts which media might have on all fields simultaneously by legitimating certain 
categories with not just cognitive but also social significance.61 This is the type of general 
media influence that, at the beginning of this article, I noted was difficult to integrate into 
production-focussed analyses.  
 
This suggestion is encouraged by consideration of Bourdieu’s later work on the French 
state. Bourdieu62 takes over and extends Weber’s63 notion of the state, conceptualising 
the state  as a monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence. In this context he 
is required to make an important distinction: between (a) the level at which the state’s 
own power (its symbolic power) is established and (b) the field in which agents (civil 
servants, politicians, and all those passing through the élite schools which, under the 
French system, control access to state positions) compete for the ‘monopoly over the 
advantages attached to [the state’s] monopoly’.64 The former (a) Bourdieu refers to as the 
‘field of power’ focussed on the state.65 What is the nature of the power the state 
 22 
exercises? Bourdieu has in mind not so much a power to act in the context of this or that 
specialist field, but preeminence over the definitions, for example, of legal and 
educational status.66 The state’s influence as a reference-point in social life works not in 
one field only, but across all fields.67 The ‘field of power’ of which the state is the central 
reference-point is not therefore, I suggest, a ‘field’ in Bourdieu’s normal sense. Rather it 
is better understood as a general space where the state exercises influence (very much 
like a general symbolic power) over the interrelations between all specific fields (in the 
usual sense),68 indeed, perhaps, acts upon social space in general. We are close here to 
the issue Craig Calhoun69 identifies, of how to understand the increasing ‘convertibility’ 
of different types of capital across the whole range of fields. The state (certainly not only 
the French state, even if the forms of influence vary in different countries) adds a specific 
dimension to this issue, because of its increasing influence over the educational field 
through which everyone passes (and indirectly therefore over the key entry-points into all 
or most specific fields of production). What is striking, however, is that Bourdieu never 
connected his or his fellow researchers’ work on the media back to his theory of symbolic 
systems or the state,70 notwithstanding the connections made elsewhere71 between media 
and politics.  
 
Can Bourdieu’s late work on the state help us grasp how the media exercise a similar 
influence on social space, including all specialist fields of production?  
 
Metacapital: From State to Media 
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In the discussions that form Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Bourdieu was asked 
whether the state is a sort of ‘meta-field’.72 His answer strikingly centres on the notion 
not so much of field, but of capital:  
 
The concentration of  . . . different types of capital goes hand in hand with the rise and 
consolidation of the various fields [i.e. the specific fields which historically have 
contributed to the power of the state]. The result of this process is the emergence of a 
specific capital, properly statist capital, born of their cumulation, which allows the 
state to wield a power over the different fields and over the various forms of capital 
that circulate in them. This kind of meta-capital capable of exercising a power over 
other species of power, and particularly over their rate of exchange . . . defines the 
specific power of the state. It follows that the constitution of the state goes hand in 
hand with the constitution of the field of power understood as the space of play in 
which holders of various forms of capital struggle in particular for power over the 
state, that is, over the state’s capital over the different species of capital and over their 
reproduction (via the school system in particular).73  
 
While the ‘field of power’ ‘above’ particular fields is a term of long-standing in 
Bourdieu’s work, what is significant here is the structured way Bourdieu sees the state’s 
own ability to influence what can count as capital in other specific fields. First, Bourdieu 
sees as a key influence on all fields a force external to them, the workings of the state. 
The state acts directly on the infrastructure of all fields: it is ‘the site of struggles, whose 
stake is the setting of the rules that govern the different social games (fields) and in 
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particular, the rules of reproduction of those games’.74 Put another way, the state 
influences the hierarchical relationship or ‘exchange rate’75 between the fundamental 
types of capital at stake in each individual field (for example, economic versus cultural 
capital).76 This power of the state is, crucially, not derived from the workings of any 
specific field, even if it is quite possible to think of the immediate space of competition 
between, say, civil servants as a ‘field’ in its own right. As to the scope of this power, it 
presumably includes, although Bourdieu does not mention this specifically, influence 
over what counts as ‘symbolic capital’ in each particular field. The concept of ‘symbolic 
capital’ in Bourdieu generally means any type of capital (economic, cultural, and so on) 
that happens to be legitimated or prestigious in a particular field,77 but the concept of 
metacapital introduces the possibility that definitions of prestige within specific fields 
may be determined by influences outside those fields, specifically the state’s metacapital. 
 
By analogy, I want to propose that we understand media power also as a form of ‘meta-
capital’ through which media exercise power over other forms of power. This gives 
clearer theoretical shape to Bourdieu’s own most interesting insights about the media. 
When Bourdieu discusses the increasing pressure of television on, say, the academic 
field,78 there is of course a direct economic dimension (a large television audience means 
more books sold), but television exerts also, he suggests, an indirect pressure by 
distorting the symbolic capital properly at stake in the academic field, creating a new 
group of academics whose symbolic capital within the academic field rests partly on their 
appearances on television. There is no reason to suppose this type of shift occurs in just 
one field and not other fields; on the contrary, it is plausibly occurring widely across the 
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whole field of specialist production fields, so that we need an overarching concept such 
as ‘meta-capital’ to capture it.  
 
Immediately, the question arises how these two types of metacapital  - the state’s and the 
media’s - interrelate: I return to this in the conclusion. For now, let us concentrate on how 
the media’s own metacapital might work, in particular how it might interact with the 
conditions obtaining in specific fields. Why assume that its influence is limited to specific 
fields of production? Just as the state’s influence on cultural capital and prestige through 
the school system (part of what Bourdieu refers to as the state’s meta-capital) is not 
confined to specific fields but radiates outward into social space generally, so the media’s 
meta-capital may impact on social space through the general circulation of media 
representations. All actors in specific fields are likely also to be actors in general social 
space and general consumers of media messages. This suggests that the media’s 
metacapital over specific fields might operate in two distinct ways: first, as Bourdieu 
explicitly suggests for the state, by influencing what counts as capital in each field; and 
second, through the media’s legitimation of influential representations of, and categories 
for understanding, the social world that, because of their generality, are available to be 
taken up in the specific conflicts in any particular field. The second type of influence 
would take us into the media’s agenda-setting role across many specific areas of life,79 
and the media’s role as the ‘frame’ within which the generality of social ‘issues’ get 
expressed and settled.80 Should we indeed understand the media as affecting the habitus 
of individual agents in all fields - a more radical causal link between media and what 
goes on in particular fields?81 Clearly to pursue this would require an article in itself. 
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Instead, let us concentrate on the first, more direct, way of understanding how the 
media’s meta-capital might work.  
 
We might understand the media as altering what counts as symbolic capital in particular 
fields through its increasing monopoly over the sites of social prestige. Indeed, by 
altering in parallel what counts as symbolic capital in a range of different fields, media 
may affect the ‘exchange rate’ between the capital competed for in different fields 
(Bourdieu makes just this point in relation to the state’s meta-capital). This is quite 
consistent with Bourdieu’s point that capital is only realised by agents in specific forms 
in specific fields.82 The symbolic capital (among, say, chefs) that derives from doing a 
successful television cookery series is not necessarily convertible into symbolic capital in 
a very different field, such as the academic field; this is because the former need involve 
few, if any, of the specific attributes valued by media in representatives of the latter. But 
this does not make the parallel structural transformation by media of the conditions 
operating in all fields any less significant, nor rule out the possibility that media-based 
symbolic capital developed in one field can under certain conditions be directly 
exchanged for symbolic capital in another field. So in Britain recently a well-known 
television gardener has quickly become a successful popular novelist; clearly this 
depends the pole of the field of cultural production (mass production or specialist) to 
which you are closest. Even so, the relationship between media as institutions and all 
other fields (from politics to the visual arts to sport) has been transformed, when being a 
player in the former has a significant chance of bringing with it influence over the terms 
on which people acquire symbolic capital in the latter. When the media intensively cover 
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an area of life for the first time (in the past decade, gardening or cooking), they alter the 
internal workings of that sub-field and increase the ambit of the media’s meta-capital 
across the social terrain. This is one important way in which over time media institutions 
have come to benefit from a truly dominant concentration of symbolic power (‘symbolic 
power’ in the strong sense, of a power over the construction of social reality).  
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that this analysis does not supersede the accounts 
of the journalistic field discussed in section 1, any more than Bourdieu’s concept of the 
state’s metacapital rules out analysing government bureaucracy in terms of a field of 
those who work for the state. The wider implication, however, of Bourdieu’s work on 
state power, which I am extending to media power, is that in contemporary, highly 
centralised societies certain institutions have a specific ability to influence all fields at 
once. This links Bourdieu’s field theory more explicitly with his other work on symbolic 
power and symbolic systems, for what is at stake at the level of metacapital is precisely 
the type of definitional power across the whole of social space which the latter concepts 
capture.  
 
There is much of course that could be said further to justify the idea that media have 
metacapital of this sort; I have tried to develop elsewhere a linked argument based on 
detailed qualitative research.83 Instead, before concluding, let me look briefly at how this 
theoretical idea might be empirically tested.  
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Ways forward for Empirical Research 
 
There are a range of questions which could be asked about how the media’s meta-capital 
is, or is not, progressively altering the operating conditions in any particular field of 
production: 
 
1. Is media exposure a significant, or even a predominant, form of symbolic capital in 
that field? (Clearly, for every (sub-)field there are detailed questions about what sort 
of media exposure counts there, and these are answerable only in terms of the 
categorisations operating in that (sub-)field, but the importance of the general 
question remains; examples of (sub-)fields where this question is worth investigating 
have already been mentioned, such as gardening or cookery, and other examples will 
be discussed below) 
2. If the answer to (1) is yes, to what extent is this changing that field’s relationship to 
other fields where media exposure is also regarded as a significant component of 
symbolic capital, by allowing successful players in the former to exchange their 
success there for symbolic capital in the latter?  
3. Against the background of (1) and (2), we can turn to the questions more regularly 
asked previously within field theory: what are the conditions of entry into the 
specialised media production field (and all its sub-fields), and how are those 
conditions changing as media-derived capital becomes significant increasingly across 
the whole range of fields?  
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These questions raise a further important issue (4): will the increasing influence of media 
over what counts as symbolic capital across all fields lead, in the longer-term, to the 
increasing convertibility of media-derived symbolic capital derived across social space as 
a whole? If so, is a new form of capital (that we might, following Champagne, call 
‘media capital’) beginning to emerge: that is, capital for use in any field based on prestige 
obtained through media exposure? In the long term, ‘media capital’ might emerge in its 
own right as a new ‘fundamental species of capital’ that works as a ‘trump card’ in all 
fields84 - just as economic capital is, and for the same reason: because of its high degree 
of exchangeability or liquidity85 - even if the means by which ‘media capital’ can be 
accumulated or exchanged distinguish it sharply from economic capital. For now, 
however, this last point must remain speculative.  
 
These questions intersect with existing work and debates on the media’s influence on 
particular fields. First, the idea that the political field is being transformed fundamentally 
by politicians’ need for media exposure has been familiar for some time;86 Champagne’s 
suggestion of the fusion of the political and media fields (noted above) is also relevant 
here. Second,  Bourdieu’s own strictures on television’s distortion of the proper values of 
the academic field87 offer at least a provocation to research into how academics’ notions 
of symbolic capital are being changed through media, but detailed research needs to be 
done. A third interesting area is the visual arts, where (as Julian Stallabrass has argued)88 
media exposure has increasingly become the stuff of artistic success, as well as the 
subject of artistic reflection (Tracey Emin’s and Gavin Turk’s work, to name just two UK 
artists of international reputation). Particularly difficult, if potentially also the most far-
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reaching in its consequences, would be research on the economic field: to what extent is 
media exposure becoming not only a sign of prestige among business players, but an 
asset that can be directly converted into economic capital? In limited forms such as ‘stars’ 
or ‘brands’, this has long been the case,89 but there is a more general question about how 
far media exposure as a token of anticipated economic success makes something like 
‘media capital’ increasingly integral to business at all levels. Qualitatively rich studies of 
contemporary business and finance cultures and their interrelations with the media field 
would be welcome.  
 
These questions, in effect, continue Bourdieu’s interest in ‘the production of belief’,90 but 
apply it across all fields and their interrelations. We need to study the categories (in a 
Durkheimian sense) through which an increasingly pervasive ‘mediatization’91 of public 




This article has developed in theoretical terms a proposal for supplementing existing 
field-based accounts of the media’s operations with an analysis of the media’s meta-
capital over all fields and social space. The aim has been to open up possible answers to 
questions unresolved in purely field-based accounts of media. The aim has also been to 
show how, by a modest extension of the field-based model that draws on the rest of 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, we can more satisfactorily deal with the difficulty of 
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explaining media as both production process and symbolic system with which the article 
began.  
 
There remain, however, some unsettled theoretical questions. First, what is the 
relationship between the media and the state, and their respective meta-capitals? Leaving 
aside the possibility that we should see the media as part of the state,92 which seems 
confusing at best, this difficult question can be only be taken forward through empirical 
explorations which (as Loic Wacquant has suggested for the state itself) need to be 
brought together on a global, comparative basis.93 They will involve detailed analysis of 
how the state and media compete as reference-points for defining key terms in specific 
fields: one example might be the definitions in play in the regulation of crime, where the 
media’s impacts on perceptions of the ‘crime problem’ are attracting increasing attention 
from sociologists.94 Second, what is the relationship between the media’s and/or the 
state’s meta-capital  and that, potentially, of other central social institutions - the 
educational system, religious institutions, corporate power? We might even want to 
conceive of Bourdieu’s field of power entirely openly as a space where media, state and 
these other institutions compete for definitional power (metacapital) over specific fields. 
Certainly there are interesting (again comparative) questions to be considered here, 
although it is more plausible, as Bourdieu’s treatment of the state’s metacapital suggests, 
to see the state as the cumulative concentration of the definitional powers of earlier 
symbolic systems (such as the educational system) which have now been absorbed into 
the state. It is the historically established ability of the state to range across many 
different fields that justifies attributing to it metacapital; only the media, I suggest, are 
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plausible rivals to the state here in most contemporary societies, in which case the second 
question soon reduces to the first. Third, it is important in formulating such questions to 
bear in mind the global space of power in which these processes are played out, 
particularly when the usefulness of the national framework for sociological questions has 
recently been challenged.95 It remains, however, to be seen, notwithstanding the growing 
importance of global media flows, whether the key social fields of contestation are 
operating on other than a national level. Clearly there are difficult questions here of 
integrating national and transnational scales into field theory. Finally, as noted earlier, the 
long-term impacts of recent less centralised means of media production and distribution 
(especially the Internet) on both the media field and the media’s meta-capital will need to 
be considered. Once again, the answers will lie not in general theorisation but in detailed 
analysis of how and in what ways and to what extent the rules, categories, and capital on 
the basis of which agents in particular fields orientate themselves towards media 
institutions are changing.  
 
The unanswerability of such questions here is not, however, a fault of the preceding 
analysis, but an example of the continued stimulation which Bourdieu’s field model can 
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